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1. Introduction
The current situation of fiscal stress has increased doubts about the future
dynamics of US public debt. As shown in figure 1, US debt-output ratio pro-
jections from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) span an increasingly
wide range over the next decades, leaving room for substantial uncertainty.
Given the distortionary nature of the main tax instruments used to finance
the government budget, it is natural to wonder to what extent such uncer-
tainty can affect consumption and investment decisions and, more broadly,
the long-term prospects of the economy. In a nutshell, figure 1 raises the
question of how the formation of beliefs and revisions about the likelihood
of different fiscal scenarios could alter economic outcomes.
In this paper, we study the impact of fiscal policy on long-term growth
when agents are uncertain about the probability distribution of future fiscal
prospects. More precisely, we assume that agents fear model uncertainty as
in Hansen and Sargent (2007) and are willing to optimally slant probabili-
ties toward the worst-case scenario. We examine the implications of worst-
fiscal-scenario beliefs in a stochastic version of the Romer (1990) endogenous
growth model that assumes that the government finances exogenous expen-
ditures using both debt and distortionary taxes on labor income. By doing
so, we are able to analyze the link between fear of misspecification of future
fiscal distortions, short-run fluctuations, and—in contrast to several other
studies—long-term growth prospects.
Using this robust control approach, we obtain the following results. First,
as aversion to model uncertainty becomes more severe, the distorted expected
value of taxes is increasingly higher than the true value. This implies that
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Figure 1: CBO Projections of Future US Debt
Notes - This Figure shows Federal Debt Held by the Public under CBO’s Long-Term
Budget Scenarios. The top panel refers to the CBO’s Long-Term Budget Outlook issued
in 2005. The bottom panel is based on the 2010 outlook. See www.cbo.gov.
agents face stronger expected tax distortions and have less incentive to work
relative to the case in which beliefs are undistorted. In our setting with en-
dogenous growth, a lower labor supply results in a smaller long-term growth
rate of consumption and produces substantial welfare losses.
Following the methodology of Barillas et al. (2009), we link welfare losses
associated with worst-case beliefs to the market price of model uncertainty,
which in our model is linked with the market price of fiscal uncertainty. We
differ from Barillas et al. (2009) in that we focus on fiscal policy in a model
with endogenous growth.
3
In order to show that there exists a significant difference between fis-
cal risk and fiscal uncertainty, we examine the implications of commonly
observed countercyclical fiscal policies seeking to stabilize short-run fluctua-
tions by means of public debt. Using exogenously specified fiscal policy rules,
we show that when growth is endogenous, financing policies that are welfare
enhancing under time-additive CRRA preferences can turn into a source of
relevant welfare losses under aversion to model uncertainty.
Intuitively, tax cuts stabilize the economy in the short run upon the
realization of adverse exogenous shocks. This reduction in short-run con-
sumption risk is a desirable benefit for both risk- and model uncertainty-
averse agents. However, the subsequent financing needs associated with
long-run budget balancing produce more persistent dynamics for long-run
distortionary taxation. In contrast to agents with CRRA preferences, agents
with preferences for robustness are averse to such long-run risks. In our
endogenous growth model, countercyclical fiscal policies end up depressing
the present value of future cash flows and hence the incentive for long-run
growth.
We discipline the aversion to model uncertainty to reproduce key fea-
tures of both US consumption and wealth-consumption ratios as measured
by Lustig et al. (2010) and Alvarez and Jermann (2004) and we find that
growth losses outweigh the benefits of short-run stabilization, as opposed to
the time-additive preferences case. Basically, counter-cyclical deficit policies
reduce uncertainty by reducing short-run volatility, but at the cost of in-
creasing the amount of long-run risk embedded in innovative products’ cash
flows. Stabilization comes at the cost of undermining long-run growth.
4
1.1. Related Literature
Karantounias (2011) and Karantounias (2012) consider fiscal policy in a
robust setting. In contrast to us, they focus on optimal Ramsey taxation and
abstract from endogenous growth, which is the key channel of our welfare
analysis. These papers provide theoretical foundations for robust optimal
fiscal policy, but they do not feature any trade-off between stabilization and
long-run growth arising from the incentives to innovate.
More broadly, our paper is related to a long list of studies in macroeco-
nomics and growth that examine the effects of fiscal policy on the macroecon-
omy. While several authors have examined stochastic fiscal policies in real
business cycle models (Dotsey (1990), Ludvigson (1996), Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2007), Davig et al. (2010), Leeper et al. (2010)), we focus on long-run
growth.
We acknowledge that fiscal policy has multiple dimensions that we ab-
stract from. For example, we exclude from our analysis learning about the
government fiscal policy (Pastor and Veronesi (2010), Pastor and Veronesi
(2011)), and utility-providing expenditures (Ferrie`re and Karantounias (2011)).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we intro-
duce our model and discuss robust preferences, endogenous growth, and the
role of government. In section 3, we briefly detail our calibration approach.
Our main results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
In this section we describe in detail the stochastic model of endogenous
growth that we use to examine the link between long-run growth, fiscal un-
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certainty and concerns for robustness. As in Romer (1990), the only source of
sustained productivity growth is related to the accumulation of new patents
on innovations that facilitate the production of the final good. In this class
of models, the speed of patent accumulation, i.e., the growth rate of the
economy, depends on the market value of the additional cash flows gener-
ated by such innovations. Given that our representative agent has concerns
for robustness, the market value of a patent is sensitive to fear about mis-
specification. Since households price uncertain payoffs using the worst-case
distribution, doubts about both future taxation and patents’ cash flows gen-
erate a premium for exposure to model uncertainty that affects incentives to
innovate and growth in the long run.
For simplicity, we abstract from physical capital accumulation. The pro-
duction of the final good is assumed to depend only on three elements: (i)
an exogenous stochastic and stationary productivity process, (ii) the stock
of patents, and (iii) the endogenous amount of labor supplied. In our model,
labor income is taxed proportionally by the government to finance an exoge-
nous stochastic expenditure stream.
2.1. Household
Consumption Bundle. In each period, the representative agent consumes a
bundle ut of consumption, Ct, and leisure, 1− Lt, defined as follows:
ut =
[
κC
1− 1
ν
t + (1− κ)[At(1− Lt)]
1− 1
ν
] 1
1− 1ν
.
We let Lt and ν denote labor and degree of complementarity between leisure
and consumption, respectively. Leisure is multiplied by At, our measure of
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standard of living, to guarantee balanced growth when ν 6= 1.
Aversion to Model Uncertainty. We assume that the representative house-
hold has Hansen and Sargent (2007) preferences defined over ut:
Ut = (1− β) lnut + βmin
mt+1
[Etmt+1Ut+1 + θEtmt+1 lnmt+1],
where mt+1 is a probability distortion constrained to integrate to unity, and
θ > 0 captures confidence in the approximating model. Our agent is afraid
that his approximating model is misspecified and considers alternative models
that are nearby in the sense of relative entropy (Etmt+1 lnmt+1). This implies
that economic decisions are based on a probability measure, π˜t+1|t, optimally
slanted towards the worst states. For θ = ∞, there is full trust of the
approximating model and these preferences reduce to expected utility. To
be precise and fix notation, let πt+1|t denote the conditional probability of
state st+1 at time t induced by the approximating model. As in Hansen and
Sargent (2007), the distorted probability can be linked to πt+1|t as follows:
π˜t+1|t = πt+1|t ·mt+1,
where the optimal mt+1 is
mt+1 =
e−
Ut+1
θ
E
[
e−
Ut+1
θ
] .
7
Inserting the optimal distortion mt+1 into the preferences of the household
delivers the indirect utility function
Ut = (1− β) logut − βθ logEt
[
e−
Ut+1
θ
]
. (1)
Robustness concerns, θ, is linked to uncertainty sensitivity, γU ≥ 1, by im-
posing θ = − 1
1−γU
. When γU = 1, these preferences collapse to standard
time-additive log preferences with risk aversion of one.
The parameter θ determines the detection error probabilities, a likelihood-
based measure of models’ ‘proximity’. Let model A be the approximating
model and model B the distorted model. Consider N different samples each
with T observations. Let Li,j|k be the likelihood of sample j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} for
model i ∈ {A,B} when model k ∈ {A,B} generates the data. We compute
error detection probabilities by assigning prior probabilities over model A
and B of 0.5:
p(θ−1) =
1
2
1
N
N∑
j=1
I
(
LA,j|A
LB,j|A
< 1
)
+ I
(
LA,j|B
LB,j|B
> 1
)
, (2)
where I is an indicator function. When models A and B are identical, p(θ−1)
is 50%. As the two models begin to diverge from each other, p(θ−1) tends
toward zero. In our computations, we set T = 235 and N = 100, 000.
Aversion to Risk. To better highlight the role of robustness, we also study
the welfare implications of countercyclical deficit policies in the alternative
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case in which the agent has standard time-additive preferences:
Ut =
[
(1− β)u1−γRt + βEt[U
1−γR
t+1 ]
] 1
1−γR . (3)
In this setting, the agent does not care about entropy, and the parameter
γR > 1 measures only aversion to consumption risk. In section 4.2, we
impose γU = γR > 1 and show that fiscal policies that improve welfare in
economies with high risk aversion and no robustness concern (equation (3))
produce welfare costs in economies with high robustness concerns (equation
(1)).
Budget Constraint and Optimality. In each period, the household chooses
labor, Lt, consumption, Ct, equity shares, Zt, and public debt holdings, Bt,
to maximize utility subject to the following budget constraint:
Ct +QtZt +Bt = (1− τt)WtLt + (Qt +Dt)Zt−1 + (1 + rf,t−1)Bt−1, (4)
where Dt denotes aggregate dividends (specified in equation (16)) and Qt is
the market value of an equity share. Wages, Wt, are taxed at a time-varying
rate, τt. The intratemporal optimality condition on labor takes the following
form:
1− κ
κ
A
(1−1/ν)
t
(
Ct
1− Lt
)1/ν
= (1− τt)Wt (5)
and implies that the household’s labor supply is directly affected by fiscal
policy.
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In equilibrium, the following asset pricing conditions hold:
Qt = Et[Λt+1(Qt+1 +Dt+1)],
1 = Et[Λt+1(1 + rf,t)],
where Λt+1 is the stochastic discount factor of the economy. The represen-
tative agent holds the entire supply of equities (normalized to be one for
simplicity, i.e., Zt = 1 ∀t) and bonds.
Stochastic Discount Factor. With robustness, the stochastic discount factor
Λt+1 is given by
Λt+1 = β
(
ut+1
ut
) 1
ν
−1(
Ct+1
Ct
)−1/ν
exp(−Ut+1/θ)
Et[exp(−Ut+1/θ)]
, (6)
and it can be decomposed as follows:
Λt+1 ≡ Λ
R
t+1Λ
U
t+1,
with
ΛRt+1 ≡ β
(
ut+1
ut
) 1
ν
−1(
Ct+1
Ct
)−1/ν
and
ΛUt+1 ≡
exp(−Ut+1/θ)
Et[exp(−Ut+1/θ)]
.
The first component, ΛRt+1, is the familiar stochastic discount factor obtained
under expected utility with RRA= IES= 1. On the other hand, ΛUt+1 is the
minimizing martingale increment associated with the robust agent’s problem.
When θ approaches infinity (γU → 1), that component goes to unity, and we
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recover the stochastic discount factor obtained under expected log utility.
We denote expectations under the true and distorted probability measures
as E[·] and E˜[·], respectively, so that we can rewrite the standard asset pricing
equation for any return Rt+1 as
1 = Et[Λt+1Rt+1] = E˜t[Λ
R
t+1Rt+1],
implying that assets are priced by ΛRt+1 under the worst-case distribution.
In this economy, the maximum conditional Sharpe ratio is σt(Λt+1)
Et(Λt+1)
, which
we decompose and interpret in robustness terms. Specifically, in what fol-
lows we refer to
σt(ΛRt+1)
Et(ΛRt+1)
as the market price of risk, while
σt(ΛUt+1)
Et(ΛUt+1)
denotes
the market price of model uncertainty. We find this terminology more appro-
priate, as σt(Λ
U
t+1) goes to zero when the concerns for robustness disappear
even though well-defined risks remain. Because in our economy tax-rate risk
is bound up with both productivity and expenditure risk, in what follows we
often refer to the market price of model uncertainty as market price of fiscal
uncertainty.
Finally, note that when the agent has time-additive preferences as in
equation (3), the stochastic discount factor is
Λt+1 = β
(
ut+1
ut
) 1
ν
−γR(Ct+1
Ct
)−1/ν
,
and it does not incorporate any robustness concern.
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2.2. Technology, Markets, and Government
Final Good Firm. There is a representative and competitive firm that pro-
duces the single final output good in the economy, Yt, using labor, Lt, and a
bundle of intermediate goods, Xit. We assume that the production function
for the final good is specified as follows:
Yt = ΩtL
1−α
t
[∫ At
0
Xαit di
]
(7)
where Ωt denotes an exogenous stationary stochastic productivity process
log(Ωt) = ρ · log(Ωt−1) + ǫt, ǫt ∼ N(0, σ
2),
and At is the total measure of intermediate goods in use at date t.
This competitive firm takes prices as given and chooses intermediate
goods and labor to maximize profits as follows:
Dt = max
Lt,Xit
Yt −WtLt −
∫ At
0
PitXitdi,
where Pit is the price of intermediate good i at time t. At the optimum,
Xit = Lt
(
Ωtα
Pit
) 1
1−α
, and Wt = (1− α)
Yt
Lt
. (8)
Intermediate Goods Firms. Each intermediate good i ∈ [0, At] is produced
by an infinitesimally small monopolistic firm. Each firm needs Xit units of
the final good to produce Xit units of its respective intermediate good i.
Given this assumption, the marginal cost of an intermediate good is fixed
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and equal to one. Taking the demand schedule of the final good producer as
given, each firm chooses its price, Pit, to maximize profits, Πit:
Πit ≡ max
Pit
PitXit −Xit.
At the optimum, monopolists charge a constant markup over marginal cost:
Pit ≡ P =
1
α
> 1.
Given the symmetry of the problem for all the monopolistic firms, we obtain
Xit = Xt = Lt(Ωtα
2)
1
1−α , (9)
Πit = Πt = (
1
α
− 1)Xt.
Equations (7) and (9) allow us to express final output in the following com-
pact form:
Yt =
1
α2
AtXt =
1
α2
AtLt(Ωtα
2)
1
1−α . (10)
Since both labor and productivity are stationary, the long-run growth rate
of output is determined by the expansion of the intermediate goods variety,
At. This expansion originates in the research and development sector that
we describe below.
Research and Development. Innovators develop new intermediate goods for
the production of final output and obtain patents on them. At the end
of the period, these patents are sold to new intermediate goods firms in a
competitive market. Starting from the next period on, the new monopolists
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produce the new varieties and make profits. We assume that each existing
variety dies, i.e., becomes obsolete, with probability δ ∈ (0, 1). In this case,
its production is terminated. Given these assumptions, the cum-dividend
value of an existing variety, Vit, is equal to the present value of all future
expected profits and can be recursively expressed as follows:
Vit = Vt = Πt + (1− δ)Et [Λt+1Vt+1] (11)
Let 1/ϑt be the marginal rate of transformation of final goods into new vari-
eties. The free-entry condition in the R&D sector implies that in equilibrium,
1
ϑt
= Et [Λt+1Vt+1] . (12)
The left-hand side of the free-entry condition measures the marginal cost
of producing an extra variety. The right-hand side, in contrast, is equal to
the end-of-period market value of the new patents. Equation (12) is at the
core of this class of models because it implicitly pins down the optimal level
of investment in R&D and ultimately the growth rate of the economy. To
see this more clearly, let St denote the units of final good devoted to R&D
investment, and notice that in our economy the total mass of varieties evolves
according to
At+1 = ϑtSt + (1− δ)At,
1 (13)
1This dynamic equation is consistent with our assumption that new patents survive
for sure in their first period of life. If new patents are allowed to immediately become
obsolete, equations (12) and (13) need to be replaced by At+1 = (1 − δ)(ϑtSt + At) and
1
ϑt
= Et [Λt+1(1− δ)Vt+1], respectively. Our results are not sensitive to this modeling
choice.
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from which we obtain
At+1
At
− 1 = ϑt
St
At
− δ.
Following Comin and Gertler (2006), we impose
ϑt = χ
(
St
At
)η−1
η ∈ (0, 1), (14)
in order to capture the idea that concepts already discovered make it easier
to come up with new ideas, ∂ϑ/∂A > 0, and that R&D investment has
decreasing marginal returns, ∂ϑ/∂S < 0.
Combining equations (12)–(14), we obtain the following optimality con-
dition for investment:
1
χ
(
St
At
)1−η
= Et
[
∞∑
j=1
Λt+j|t(1− δ)
j−1
(
1
α
− 1
)
(Ωt+jα
2)
1
1−αLt+j
]
(15)
where Λt+j|t ≡
∏j
s Λt+s|t is the j–steps-ahead pricing kernel. Equation (15)
suggests that the extent of innovation intensity in the economy, St/At, is
directly related to the discounted value of future profits and, ultimately,
future labor conditions. When agents expect labor above steady state, they
will have an incentive to invest more in R&D, ultimately boosting long-
run growth. Vice versa, when agents expect labor to remain below steady
state, they will revise downward their evaluation of patents and will reduce
their investment in innovation and, therefore, future growth. We discuss this
intuition further in section 2.3.
Stock Market. Given the multisector structure of the model, various assump-
tions on the constituents about the stock market can be adopted. We assume
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that the stock market value includes all the production sectors described
above, namely, the final good, the intermediate goods, and the R&D sector.
Taking into account the fact that both the final good and the R&D sector
are competitive, aggregate dividends are simply equal to monopolistic profits
net of investment:
Dt = ΠtAt − St. (16)
Government. The government faces an exogenous and stochastic expenditure
stream, Gt, that evolves as follows:
Gt
Yt
=
1
1 + e−gyt
, (17)
where
gyt = (1− ρ)gy + ρggyt−1 + ǫG,t, ǫG,t ∼ N(0, σ
2
gy).
This specification ensures that Gt ∈ (0, Yt) ∀t. In order to finance these
expenditures, the government can use tax income, Tt = τtWtLt, or public
debt according to the following budget constraint:
Bt = (1 + rf,t−1)Bt−1 +Gt − Tt. (18)
We focus on two tax regimes. Under the first, the government commits to a
zero-deficit policy and sets the tax rate, τ zdt , as follows:
τ zdt =
Gt/Yt
1− α
.
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In this case, the tax rate perfectly mimics the properties of our exogenous
government expenditure process. Under the second regime, in contrast, the
government runs surpluses or deficits according to the following rule for the
debt-output ratio:
Bt
Yt
= ρB
Bt−1
Yt−1
+ φB · (logLSS − logLt), (19)
where LSS is the steady-state level of labor, ρB ∈ (0, 1) measures the inverse
of the speed of debt repayment, and φB ≥ 0 is the intensity of the policy.
Combining (18) and (19), the tax rate becomes
τt(ρB, φB) = τ
zd
t +
1
1− α
(
1 + rf,t−1
Yt/Yt−1
− ρB
)
Bt−1
Yt−1
+φB
logLt − logLSS
1− α
. (20)
When φB > 0, our simple debt policy rule captures the behavior of a gov-
ernment that is concerned about employment and wants to minimize labor
fluctuations. In particular, the government cuts labor taxes (increases debt)
when labor is below steady state and increases them (reduces debt) in peri-
ods of boom for the labor market. The second term on the right-hand side
of equation (20) captures the persistent effect that debt repayment has on
taxes. The condition ρB < 1 ensures that the public administration keeps
the debt-output ratio stationary. In the language of Leeper et al. (2010), we
anchor expectations about debt and rule out unsustainable paths.
Aggregate Resource Constraint. In this economy, the final good market clear-
ing condition implies:
Yt = Ct + St + AtXt +Gt.
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Final output, therefore, is used for consumption, R&D investment, produc-
tion of intermediate goods, and public expenditure.
2.3. Some Properties of the Equilibrium
Combining equations (12)—(15), it is possible to show that as long as η ∈
(0, 1) the growth rate of the economy is a positive monotonic transformation
of the patent value:2
At+1
At
= 1− δ + χ
1
1−ηEt [Λt+1Vt+1]
η
1−η . (21)
This implies that characterizing the impact of both robustness and tax un-
certainty on long-run growth is isomorphic to analyzing the asset pricing
properties of both patent value and pricing kernel. To this aim, assume for
the time being that log profits, lnΠt, and log consumption bundle growth,
∆ct, are jointly linear-gaussian and contain a predictable component:
∆ct+1 = µ+ xc,t + σ
SR
c ε
c
t+1 (22)
lnΠt+1 = Π+ xΠ,t + σ
SR
Π ε
pi
t+1
xc,t+1 = ρcxc,t + σ
LR
c ε
xc
t+1
xΠ,t+1 = ρΠxΠ,t + σ
LR
Π ε
xΠ
t+1
εt+1 ≡
[
εct+1 ε
pi
t+1 ε
xc
t+1 ε
xΠ
t+1
]
∼ i.i.d.N.(
−→
0 ,Σ),
where Σ has ones on its main diagonal. In the spirit of Bansal and Yaron
(2004), we think of εc and εpi as short-run shocks to consumption growth and
2If η = 1, the supply of new patents is perfectly flexible and their value has to be
constant over time: ϑt = χ.
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profits, respectively. The predictable components xΠ and xc, in contrast, are
long-run risks.
To stay as close as possible to the Bansal and Yaron (2004) framework,
assume also that Ct/(At(1 − Lt)) is constant. Given these simplifying as-
sumptions, we obtain the following exact closed-form solution for the pricing
kernel:
ln Λt+1 − Et[ln Λt+1] =
 −γRσSRc εct+1 CRRA−γUσSRc εct+1 − β γU−11−ρcβσLRc εxct+1 Robustness.(23)
By no arbitrage, the log return of a patent, rV,t+1 = ln(Vt+1/(Vt − Πt)),
satisfies the following condition:
rV,t+1 −Et[rV,t+1] ≈ κ2σ
SR
Π ǫ
Π
t+1 −
κ1
1− κ1ρc
σLRc ǫ
xc
t+1 +
κ2
1− κ1ρΠ
σLRΠ ǫ
xΠ
t+1, (24)
where κ1 = (V − Π)/V and κ2 = Π/V are approximation constants.
Since the average value of a patent is decreasing in the risk premium of
its return, Et[rV,t+1 − r
f
t ] ≈ −covt(ln Λt+1, rV,t+1), these equations help us
to make three relevant points. First, with CRRA preferences, the reduction
of short-run consumption risk, σSRc , is sufficient to reduce the market price
of risk and hence the riskiness of the patents, i.e., short-run stabilization
promotes growth.
Second, with robustness preferences, the market price of risk strongly
depends on both the persistence, ρc, and the volatility, σ
LR
c , of the long-run
component in consumption. For high enough values of γU , growth is pinned
down mainly by long-run consumption risk, as opposed to short-run risk.
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Third, in general equilibrium our cash-flow parameters are endogenous
objects and depend on fiscal policy through φB and ρB. After calibrating the
model, we explore the role of φB and ρB in varying the amount of short- and
long-run risk and altering long-run growth.
3. Calibration
We report our benchmark calibration in table 1 and the implied main
statistics of the model in table 2. Our parameter choices are based on the
zero-deficit policy, and we exploit balanced growth restrictions whenever ap-
plicable. Our productivity process is then calibrated to replicate several key
properties of US consumption growth over the long sample 1929–2008. We
choose a long sample to better capture long-run growth dynamics. Under our
benchmark calibration, average annual consumption growth is 2.8%, while
the volatility is about 2.6%.
The parameters for the government expenditure-output ratio are set to
have an average share of 10% at the deterministic steady state and an annual
volatility of 4%, consistent with US annual data over the sample 1929–2008.
Under the zero-deficit policy, this parameterization implies an average labor
tax rate of 33.5%, in line with the empirical counterpart in our sample.
The robustness parameter θ and subjective discount factor β are set to
replicate the low historical average of the risk-free rate and the consump-
tion claim risk premium estimated by Lustig et al. (2010). The replication
of these asset-pricing moments is important because it imposes a strict dis-
cipline on the way in which innovations are priced and average growth is
determined. Our choice of θ corresponds to setting γU = 10, which implies
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a detection error probability of 1.15%. The parameters ν and κ control the
labor supply and are chosen to yield steady-state hours worked of 1/3 of the
time endowment and a steady-state Frisch elasticity of 0.7, respectively, in
line with the empirical evidence.
Turning to technology parameters, the constant α captures the relative
weight of labor and intermediate goods in the production of final goods, and,
by equation (9), controls the markup and hence profits in the economy. We
choose this parameter to match the empirical share of profits in aggregate
income of about 16%. The parameter η, the elasticity of new intermediate
goods with respect to R&D, is within the range of panel and cross-sectional
estimates of Griliches (1990). Since the variety of intermediate goods can
be interpreted as the stock of R&D (a directly observable quantity), we can
then interpret δ as the depreciation rate of the R&D stock. We set 1 − δ
to 0.97, which corresponds to an annual depreciation rate of about 14%,
i.e., the value assumed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in its R&D stock
calculations. The scale parameter χ is chosen to match the average growth
rate.
4. The Market Price of Fiscal Uncertainty
In this section we study the link between concerns for robustness, fiscal
uncertainty, and growth. We first assume that the government is committed
to a zero-deficit policy. This case serves as a useful benchmark highlighting
the basic features of our model. Second, we examine the effectiveness of
common countercyclical and persistent deficit policies.
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Table 1: Calibration
Description Symbol Value
Preference Parameters
Consumption-Labor Elasticity ν 0.72
Utility Share of Consumption κ 0.11
Discount Factor β 0.997
Robustness Concern θ 0.111
Technology Parameters
Elasticity of Substitution Between Intermediate Goods α 0.7
Autocorrelation of Productivity ρ 0.97
Scale Parameter χ 0.52
Survival rate of intermediate goods 1− δ 0.97
Elasticity of New Intermediate Goods wrt R&D η 0.83
Standard Deviation of Technology Shock σ 0.006
Government Expenditure Parameters
Level of Expenditure-Output Ratio (G/Y ) gy −2.2
Autocorrelation of G/Y ρG 0.98
Standard deviation of G/Y shocks σG 0.008
Notes - This table reports the benchmark quarterly calibration of our model dis-
cussed in section 3.
4.1. Zero-Deficit Policies
Under the zero-deficit policy, exogenous shocks to the expenditure-output
ratio are fully absorbed in the tax rate in each period and each state of the
world. The properties of the tax rate process are determined solely by the
properties of both the exogenous productivity and public expenditure shocks.
In table 2 we report various moments from simulations of our model
computed both true and distorted measures. We focus on varying degrees
of robustness concerns as captured by detection error probabilities. Column
2 refers to our benchmark calibration; the other columns are obtained by
progressively reducing γU while keeping the other parameters fixed.
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Table 2: Main Statistics under Zero-Deficit
Data Benchmark p(θ−1) = 5% p(θ−1) = 10%
σ(∆c) 2.60 2.67 2.68 2.69
ACF1(∆c) 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.43
σ(Et[∆ct+1]) 0.49 0.47 0.46
ACF1(Et[∆ct+1]) 0.93 0.93 0.93
E(∆c)− E˜(∆c) 1.35 0.87 0.57
E˜(ǫ) −1.56e−3 −9.98e−4 −6.55e−4
E˜(ǫG) 2.01e
−4 1.24e−4 0.77e−4
E˜(τ)− E(τ) 0.05 0.02 0.01
E˜(log(V ))− E(log(V )) −0.57 −0.39 −0.26
E(log U
A
) 99.56 99.88 100.08
E(rC,ex) 1.76 1.15 0.77
E(τ) 33.5 33.51 33.51 33.51
σ(τ) 2.64 2.63 2.63
Notes - This table reports the annualized summary statistics obtained from sim-
ulations of our model. The benchmark case corresponds to the calibration in
table 1. For the other cases, we adjust θ to obtain the indicated detection error
probabilities, p(θ−1). All figures are multiplied by 100, except the first-order au-
tocorrelation, ACF1, and the distorted expectations E˜(ǫ) and E˜(ǫG). The excess
returns to the consumption claim are denoted by rC,ex. Tax rate, value of patents,
and standardized utility in log units are denoted by τ , V , and log UA , respectively.
Consider first the implied moments for consumption growth, i.e., the main
determinant of welfare. The unconditional volatility of consumption is close
to its empirical counterpart across all levels of error detection probabilities.
After taking time aggregation into account, the autocorrelation of annualized
consumption growth is modest. On the other hand, the conditional expec-
tation of consumption growth is volatile and extremely persistent, implying
that the model generates a fair amount of endogenous long-run consumption
risk.
Given the strong impact that long-run risk has on discounted entropy, the
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gap between the true and distorted expected growth rates of consumption is
sizeable. Furthermore, since our model is very close to log-linear, we observe
distortions only in the first moment of our variables of interest, consistent
with the results of Anderson et al. (2003) and Bidder and Smith (2011), who
document no distortion in second or higher moments.
The negative distortion in expected consumption growth is the natural
result of pessimistic expectations about both productivity and government
expenditure shocks. Our agent, indeed, slants probabilities toward states in
which productivity shocks are negative and government expenditure shocks
are positive. In these states, the tax base is low while the liabilities of the gov-
ernment are high. Agents, therefore, expect higher levels of taxation under
the undesired worst-case scenario. Equation (21) clarifies the implications of
these distortions for growth: a higher expected tax rate triggers a perma-
nent decrease in after-tax expected wages, labor supply, future profits, and
perceived value of patents, E˜(log(V )), ultimately discouraging investment in
innovative products.
As robustness concerns increase, the implied decline in the value of patents
and growth depresses welfare to a greater extent. Simultaneously, the desire
for further robustness increases model uncertainty and hence the premium
associated with consumption cash flow. Our benchmark specification gener-
ates a substantial consumption risk premium of about 1.75, in line with the
empirical estimates of Lustig et al. (2010). This premium is mainly driven
by model uncertainty, as shown by the fact that it rapidly decreases when
the concern for robustness declines.
Under our benchmark calibration, the average tax rate is roughly 33.5%,
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consistent with the data. On the other hand, the implied volatility of taxes
is moderate, in the order of 2.6%. Our results, therefore, are not driven by
an excessively volatile tax rate.
These results can be better understood by examining the impulse re-
sponses of key quantities after a positive one-standard-deviation shock to
G/Y . In figure 2 we depict the dynamic response of both short- and long-
horizon variables for various degrees of robustness concerns. We distinguish
between aversion to model uncertainty and aversion to risk (the dash-dotted
green line). We start by discussing the case of aversion to model uncertainty.
When an adverse government shock materializes, labor tends to fall, as
figure 2 shows. This is due to a substitution effect: under the zero-deficit
policy, higher government expenditures directly translate into a higher tax,
which depresses the supply of labor. This effect gets weaker when the concern
for robustness becomes stronger. This reflects the intuition that a greater
concern for robustness makes the agent feel more pessimistic and work harder
(income effect). However, the more stable short-run dynamics come at the
cost of lower expected recovery speed (top-right panel). This is because
agents perceive higher expected taxes when the robustness concerns are more
severe.
Output and consumption exhibit similar patterns when we focus on their
short-run dynamics (left panels): stronger concerns for robustness are asso-
ciated with more stable short-run responses. Expected output and consump-
tion growth (right panels)drop when aversion to model uncertainty increases.
According to equations (21)–(24), this result can be explained by examining
the two key determinants of aggregate growth, namely expected future prof-
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Figure 2: Short- and Long-Run Dynamics following adverse G/Y Shock
Notes - This figure shows quarterly log-deviations from the steady state multi-
plied by 100. The benchmark case corresponds to the calibration in table 1. For
the other cases, we adjust θ to obtain the indicated detection error probabilities.
CRRA corresponds to time-additive preferences described in (3) with γR = 10.
its and the stochastic discount factor. Since government expenditures are
persistent, the agent anticipates higher expenditures and hence higher tax
rates for the long-run. The lower incentives to supply labor generate lower
long-run expected profits and hence a severe drop in the value of patents.
Since investments fall, expected growth is automatically revised downward.
On the discount rate side, an increase in aversion to model uncertainty ampli-
fies the expectations adjustment just described. The cash-flow and discount
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Table 3: Market Price of Risk
Benchmark p(θ−1) = 5% p(θ−1) = 10% CRRA
σ(Λ)/E(Λ) 0.28 0.18 0.13 0.09
σ(ΛU)/E(ΛU) 0.26 0.17 0.11 0.00
Notes - This table reports market price of risk and fiscal uncertainty under different
degrees of robustness concerns. The benchmark case corresponds to the calibration
in table 1. For the other cases, we adjust θ to obtain the indicated detection error
probabilities, p(θ−1). The last column refers to the case in which the agent has
time-additive CRRA preferences as in equation (3) with relative risk aversion equal
to 10.
rate channels, therefore, work in the same direction and reinforce each other.
In our benchmark calibration, the implicit value for γU is 10. The dashed
and dotted lines in figure 2 refer to the case in which we impose γR = 10
and focus on risk aversion with CRRA preferences, as in equation (3). The
dynamics of consumption changes drastically when we focus on an economy
featuring pure aversion to risk. First of all, upon the realization of an adverse
government expenditure shock, labor falls much less, the reason being that
in this setting the agent cares only about short-run uncertainty, and invest-
ment decisions are no longer significantly sensitive to a long-run increase in
taxes. Expected long-run growth of output, therefore, falls by less. Long-run
consumption growth actually becomes positive, as the agent anticipates that
government expenditures will decline as a fraction of output and will leave
more resources available for private consumption.
The dynamics of macroeconomic quantities depend crucially on whether
we capture aversion to model uncertainty or risk (figure 2). To be more
precise about this point, in table 3 we show volatility and composition of the
pricing kernel Λ for all four calibrations used in figure 2.
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Our benchmark model generates a maximum Sharpe ratio of 0.28, well
within the Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) bound. Across all the calibra-
tions of θ, almost all of the volatility of the pricing kernel can be attributed
to model uncertainty. Intuitively, our model generates persistent variations
in expected consumption growth that are a source of serious concern for an
agent seeking robustness, since such low-frequency dynamics are hard to de-
tect in a short sample. These persistent variations in expected consumption
growth are a source of long-run risk (Bansal and Yaron (2004)) endogenously
related to investment and public expenditure shocks.
With standard time-additive CRRA preferences, the agent is not con-
cerned with long-run model uncertainty, and for this reason all the pricing
kernel volatility is related to short-run consumption volatility. Even when
the relative risk aversion, γR, is calibrated to a value as high as 10, the mar-
ket price of risk remains small, as the agent manages to hedge a substantial
amount of short-run consumption risk through investments.
Summarizing, we find that fiscal uncertainty in an endogenous growth
setting with robustness concerns leads to higher perceived taxation, lower
perceived growth, and welfare losses. These welfare losses are intimately
connected to the volatility of the stochastic discount factor, which is driven
almost exclusively by model uncertainty. These findings suggest that even a
small alteration of tax dynamics can produce substantial changes in growth
and welfare. In the next section we connect model uncertainty to more
general public financing policies aimed at stabilizing the economy over the
short run and show that they may actually be suboptimal with respect to a
simple zero-deficit policy.
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4.2. Public Debt and Endogenous Tax Uncertainty
In this section we allow the government to run deficits and surpluses and
let taxes evolve according to equation (20). In panels A and B of figure 3
we depict the response of the tax rate after a positive shock to government
expenditures and a negative shock to productivity, respectively. According
to equation (19), in both cases the government responds to these shocks by
initially lowering the tax rate below the level required to have a zero deficit.
Over the long horizon, however, the government increases taxation above
average in order to run surpluses and repay debt. Good news for short-run
taxation levels always comes with bad news for long-run fiscal pressure. Since
this is true also with time-additive preferences, for the sake of brevity we plot
only the responses under our benchmark calibration.
The main goal of the remainder of this section is to illustrate that with
robustness preferences the welfare implications of commonly used counter-
cyclical deficit rules are quite different from those normally obtained with
time-additive preferences. In what follows, we first describe the impact of
this fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates by looking at impulse response
functions. Second, we show that our simple countercyclical fiscal policy gen-
erates welfare benefits with respect to a simple zero-deficit rule when the
agent has CRRA preferences. Third, we show that when the agent is averse
to model uncertainty, the same fiscal policy may generate, in contrast, sig-
nificant welfare costs.
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Figure 3: Impulse response of Tax Rate and Debt
Notes - This figure shows quarterly log-deviations from the steady state for the govern-
ment expenditure-output ratio (G/Y), debt-output ratio (B/Y), and labor tax (τ). Panel
A refers to an adverse shock to government expenditure. Panel B refers to a negative pro-
ductivity shock. All deviations are multiplied by 100. All the parameters are calibrated
to the values used in table 1. The zero-deficit policy is obtained by imposing φB = 0. The
countercyclical policy is obtained by setting ρ4
B
= .975 and φB = 0.25%.
4.2.1. Short-run dynamics and long-run expectations
Keeping the behavior of the tax rate in mind, we now turn our attention to
the behavior of labor, output, and consumption growth upon the realization
of an adverse government expenditure shock. The left-hand panels of figure
4 show the short-run dynamics of these macroeconomic quantities, while the
right-hand panels depict the response of conditional expectations. We point
out two relevant differences. First, the responses of lt, ∆yt, and ∆ct upon
the realization of an adverse expenditure shock are less pronounced than
those observed in figure 2 in the zero-deficit specification. This implies that
our exogenous policy accomplishes the task for which it is designed, i.e., it
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions with Tax Smoothing
Notes - This figure shows impulse response functions under the probability measure
induced by the approximating model. All the parameters are calibrated to the
values used in table 1. The lines depicted in each plot are associated with different
levels of robustness concerns, θ = −(1 − γU )
−1, and detection error probabilities,
p(θ−1). Under the benchmark calibration, γU = 10. The dashed and dotted line
refer to the time-additive CRRA case with γR = 10.
reduces short-run fluctuations.
Second, under CRRA the response of the conditional expectations is al-
most unaltered with respect to the zero-deficit case. Under the robustness
case, however, the adjustment is amplified when deficits are countercycli-
cal. Specifically, in the economy with robustness concerns, the short-run
stabilization comes at the cost of having a more pronounced and pessimistic
adjustment of the expectations about future growth. According to equa-
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tion (21), expectations about growth are just a monotonic transformation of
patents’ values, and ultimately depend on the properties of profits.
In figure 5(a) we show what happens to both the intertemporal com-
position of profit risk and the value of a patent as we change the policy
parameters (ρB, φB) under our benchmark calibration. For a given ρB, as
the intensity of the policy φB increases, the short-run volatility of profits
declines (top-right panel), while simultaneously the long-run component of
profits becomes more persistent (bottom-left panel). When the household
cares about discounted entropy, more persistent long-run profit fluctuations
may generate a substantial increase in the average excess return. In our case,
as φB increases, the government budget constraint triggers more severe long-
run taxation adjustments, which produce long-lasting adverse fluctuations in
labor and profits. The increased persistence of long-run profits dominates
the decline of short-run risk and causes future profits to be discounted at a
higher rate. This explains why a more intense countercyclical deficit policy
ultimately depresses patent values (top-left panel) and growth.
Furthermore, the negative effects of countercyclical deficit policies on
patent valuation and growth become more severe when the debt persistence,
ρB, increases. More persistent tax-rate fluctuations amplify long-lasting
profit risk and depress growth even though more short-run stabilization is
achieved. With time-additive CRRA preferences, in contrast, the value of
the patents increases with cyclical deficit policies, as shown in figure 5(b),
because there is no concern about model uncertainty, and fiscal stabilization
indeed reduces aggregate short-run risk.
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Figure 5: Patents’ Value and Profits Distribution
Notes - This figure shows the average value of patents, E[V ], and key moments of log profits, π = lnΠ. StDt(πt+1),
StD(Et[πt+1]) and ACF1Et[πt+1]) are the model counterparts of σ
SR
Π , ρΠ, and σ
LR
Π in (22), respectively. All the parame-
ters are calibrated to the values used in table 1. In panel A, we use preferences for robustness and fix γU = 10. In panel B, we
use CRRA preferences with γR = 10. The two lines reported in each plot are associated to different levels of intensity of the
countercyclical fiscal policy described in equation (19). ‘Weak’ and ‘strong’ policies are generated by calibrating φB to 0.1%
and 0.25%, respectively. The horizontal axis corresponds to different annualized autocorrelation, ρ4
B
, of the debt-to-output
ratio, BG/Y ; the higher the autocorrelations, the lower the speed of repayment.
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Taken together, these results suggest that the intertemporal distribution
of tax distortions matters when the agent assumes the worst-case scenario. In
a model with endogenous growth and robustness concerns, the financing mix
of taxes and debt significantly feeds back on patent valuation and long-run
growth prospects.
4.2.2. Welfare and growth incentives
We measure welfare costs in terms of percentage of lifetime consumption
bundle. Details about the computations are reported in the appendix. We
start by focusing on the case of time-additive preferences where γR is a pure
measure of risk aversion. In the top-left panel of figure 6(b), we plot wel-
fare costs (benefits) obtained by departing from the zero-deficit policy and
implementing countercyclical deficits with different levels of intensity, φB,
and persistence, ρB. The top- and the bottom-right panels show short- and
long-run consumption risk as a function of φB and ρB, respectively. The
bottom-left panel shows changes in the unconditional growth rate of con-
sumption with respect to a zero-deficit policy.
The main message of this figure is simple: with standard preferences,
our exogenous financing policy is able to reduce short-run consumption risk,
promote growth, and generate welfare benefits. These results, however, are
completely overturned under our benchmark calibration featuring robustness
concerns, as shown in figure 6(a).
The top-left panel of this figure, indeed, shows that standard counter-
cyclical financing policies may produce welfare losses that are very sizable,
especially relative to the small benefits depicted in figure 6(b). The top-right
panel of figure 6(a) shows that the government is still able to stabilize con-
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sumption dynamics in the short run when using more aggressive fiscal policies
(stronger intensity, φB, or persistence, ρB). The problem, however, is that
such short-run stabilization comes at the cost of increased persistence of long-
run profits, which yields more pronounced long-run consumption fluctuations
and lower unconditional growth. Since growth is a first-order determinant of
welfare, the final result is an impoverishment of the household.
Countercyclical fiscal policies are indeed able to reduce model uncertainty,
no matter whether we measure it through detection error probabilities (top-
left panel of figure 7), distortions to expected productivity and expenditure
shocks (top-right and bottom-left panels, respectively), or market price of
fiscal uncertainty (bottom-right panel).
Unfortunately, however, these accomplishments come at the cost of allow-
ing more long-run profit risk (higher ρΠ in the linear cash-flow specification
(22)). We emphasize the word risk because the increase in the persistence of
the profit fluctuations is obtained under both the true and distorted proba-
bility measures. As anticipated, we find no significant distortion in second
moments. The agent hence is perfectly aware that a stronger countercyclical
deficit policy produces stronger swings in long-run tax rates, labor, profits,
and growth.
In a model with exogenous growth, the reduction of model uncertainty
automatically produces substantial welfare benefits (Barillas et al. (2009)),
but in an endogenous-growth economy, the reduction of model uncertainty
can come at the cost of depressing growth for the long-run. More broadly,
our welfare results suggest that this trade-off should be taken seriously into
account when working on optimal fiscal policy design, and that the current
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Figure 6: Welfare Costs and Consumption Distribution
Notes - This figure shows the welfare costs and key moments of consumption growth. StDt(∆ct+1), StD(Et[∆ct+1]) and
ACF1Et[∆ct+1]) are the model counterparts of σ
SR
c , ρc, and σ
LR
c in (22), respectively. All the parameters are calibrated to the
values used in table 1. In panel A, we use preferences for robustness and fix γU = 10. In panel B, we use CRRA preferences
with γR = 10. The two lines reported in each plot are associated with different levels of intensity of the countercyclical fiscal
policy described in equation (19). ‘Weak’ and ‘Strong’ policies are generated by calibrating φB to 0.1% and 0.25%, respectively.
The horizontal axis corresponds to different annualized autocorrelations, ρ4
B
, of the debt-to-output ratio, BG/Y ; the higher
the autocorrelation, the lower the speed of repayment. Welfare costs are calculated as in Lucas (1987).
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Figure 7: Pessimistic Distortions and Tax-smoothing
Notes - This figure shows detection error probabilities, pessimistic distortions and
market price of uncertainty as a function of the policy parameters φB and ρB.
All other parameters are calibrated to the values used in Tables 1. The two
lines reported in each plot are associated to different levels of intensity of the
countercyclical fiscal policy described in equation (19). ‘Weak’ and ‘Strong’ policies
are generated by calibrating φB to 0.1% and 0.25%, respectively. Horizontal axis
corresponds to different annualized autocorrelation, ρ4B , of debt to output ratio,
BG/Y ; the higher the autocorrelation, the lower the speed of repayment.
attention to short-run stabilization may be questionable.
5. Conclusion
Most of the literature in macroeconomics and growth assumes that agents
know the true probability distribution of future fiscal policy instrument dy-
namics. In this paper, in contrast, we introduce concerns for robustness as in
Hansen and Sargent (2007)) in an endogenous growth model in which fiscal
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policy can alter both short- and long-run economic dynamics.
We show that common countercyclical deficit policies which are welfare-
enhancing with time-additive CRRA preferences can turn into a source of
large welfare losses when agents have concerns for robustness. The reason
is that there is a relevant trade-off between model uncertainty and long-run
profit risks. Reducing short-run uncertainty through persistent public deficits
or surpluses can reduce pessimistic distortions, but at the cost of bringing
about more risk for long-run profits.
Future research should integrate business cycle considerations into our
model and study the optimality of multiple tax instruments. Furthermore,
it will be important to study the optimal interaction between monetary and
fiscal policy over both the short- and the long-run. Finally, our model ab-
stracts from financial and labor market frictions. Whether these elements
could increase or reduce the performance of standard countercyclical deficit
policies with robustness is a question that we leave for future research.
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Appendix: Solution Method and Welfare Costs
Solution Method and Computations. We solve the model in dynare++4.2.1 using
a third-order approximation. The policies are centered about a fix-point that takes
into account the effects of volatility on decision rules. In the .mat file generated by
dynare++ the vector with the fix-point for all our endogenous variables is denoted
as dyn ss. All conditional moments are computed by means of simulations with a
fixed seed to facilitate the comparison across fiscal policies.
Welfare Costs. Consider two consumption bundle processes, {u1} and {u2}. We
express welfare costs as the additional fraction λ of lifetime consumption bundle
required to make the representative agent indifferent between {u1} and {u2}:
U0({u
1}) = U0({u
2}(1 + λ)).
Since we specify U so that it is homogenous of degree one with respect to u, the
following holds:
U0({u
1})
u10
· u10 =
U0({u
2})
u20
· u20 · (1 + λ).
This shows that the welfare costs depend both on the utility-consumption ratio
and the initial level of our two consumption profiles. In our production economy,
the initial level of consumption is endogenous, so we cannot choose it. The initial
level of patents, Ai0 i ∈ {1, 2}, in contrast, is exogenous:
U0({u
1})
u10
·
u10
A10
· A10 =
U0({u
2})
u20
·
u20
A20
·A20 · (1 + λ).
We compare economies with different tax regimes, but the same initial condition
for the stock of patents: A10 = A
2
0. After taking logs, evaluating utility– and
consumption–productivity ratios at their unconditional mean, and imposing A10 =
A20, we obtain the following expression:
λ ≈ lnU1/A− lnU2/A,
where the bar denotes the unconditional average which is computed using the
dyn ss variable in dynare++.
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